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Abstract
In recent years the question of whether adding the limited principle of omniscience,
LPO, to constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, CZF, increases its strength has
arisen several times. As the addition of excluded middle for atomic formulae to CZF
results in a rather strong theory, i.e. much stronger than classical Zermelo set theory,
it is not obvious that its augmentation by LPO would be proof-theoretically benign.
The purpose of this paper is to show that CZF+RDC+LPO has indeed the same
strength as CZF, where RDC stands for relativized dependent choice. In particular,
these theories prove the same Π0
2
theorems of arithmetic.
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1 Introduction
Constructive Set Theory was introduced by John Myhill in a seminal paper [10], where
a specific axiom system CST was introduced. Through developing constructive set the-
ory he wanted to isolate the principles underlying Bishop’s conception of what sets and
functions are, and he wanted “these principles to be such as to make the process of for-
malization completely trivial, as it is in the classical case” ([10], p. 347). Myhill’s CST
was subsequently modified by Aczel and the resulting theory was called Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, CZF. A hallmark of this theory is that it possesses a type-theoretic interpre-
tation (cf. [1, 3]). Specifically, CZF has a scheme called Subset Collection Axiom (which
is a generalization of Myhill’s Exponentiation Axiom) whose formalization was directly
inspired by the type-theoretic interpretation.
Certain basic principles of classical mathematics are taboo for the constructive math-
ematician. Bishop called them principles of omniscience. The limited principle of om-
niscience, LPO, is an instance of the law of excluded middle which usually serves as a
line of demarcation, separating “constructive” from “non-constructive” theories. Over the
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last few years the question of whether adding LPO to constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory increases its strength has arisen several times. As the addition of excluded middle
for atomic formulae to CZF results in a rather strong theory, i.e. much stronger than
classical Zermelo set theory, it is not obvious that its augmentation by LPO would be
proof-theoretically benign. The purpose of this paper is to show that CZF+RDC+LPO
has indeed the same strength asCZF, whereRDC stands for relativized dependent choice.
In particular, these theories prove the same Π02 theorems of arithmetic. The main tool will
be a realizability model for CZF +RDC + LPO that is based on recursion in a type-2
object. This realizability interpretation is shown to be formalizable in the theory of bar
induction, BI, which is known to have the same strength as CZF.
To begin with we recall some principles of omniscience. Let 2N be Cantor space, i.e
the set of all functions from the naturals into {0, 1}.
Definition 1.1 Limited Principle of Omniscience (LPO):
∀f ∈ 2N [∃n f(n) = 1 ∨ ∀n f(n) = 0].
Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience (LLPO):
∀f ∈ 2N (∀n,m[f(n) = f(m) = 1→ n = m] → [∀n f(2n) = 0 ∨ ∀n f(2n+ 1) = 0]).
LPO is incompatible with both Brouwerian mathematics and Russian constructivism.
With LLPO the story is more complicated as it is by and large compatible with Rus-
sian constructivism, namely with the form of Church Thesis saying that every function
from naturals to naturals is computable (recursive) even on the basis of full intuitionistic
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (see [5]).
2 The theory BI
In the presentation of subsystems of second order arithmetic we follow [15]. By L2 we
denote the language of these theories. ACA0 denotes the theory of arithmetical compre-
hension.
Definition 2.1 For a 2-place relation ≺ and an arbitrary formula F (a) of L2 we define
Prog(≺, F ) := ∀x[∀y(y ≺ x→ F (y))→ F (x)] (progressiveness)
TI(≺, F ) := Prog(≺, F )→ ∀xF (x) (transfinite induction)
WF(≺) := ∀XTI(≺,X) :=
∀X(∀x[∀y(y ≺ x→ y ∈ X))→ x ∈ X]→ ∀x[x ∈ X]) (well-foundedness).
Let F be any collection of formulæ of L2. For a 2-place relation ≺ we will write ≺∈ F , if
≺ is defined by a formula Q(x, y) of F via x ≺ y := Q(x, y).
The bar induction scheme is the collection of all formulæ of the form
WF(≺)→ TI(≺, F ),
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where ≺ is an arithmetical relation (set parameters allowed) and F is an arbitrary formula
of L2.
The theory ACA0 + bar induction will be denoted by BI. In Simpson’s book the
acronym used for bar induction is Π1
∞
-TI0 (cf. [15, §VII.2]).
Theorem 2.2 The following theories have the same proof-theoretic strength:
(i) BI
(ii) CZF
(iii) The theory ID1 of (non-iterated) arithmetical inductive definitions.
There is an interesting other way of characterizing BI which uses the notion of a
countable coded ω-model.
Definition 2.3 Let T be a theory in the language of second order arithmetic, L2. A
countable coded ω-model of T is a set W ⊆ N, viewed as encoding the L2-model
M = (N,S,+, ·, 0, 1, <)
with S = {(W )n | n ∈ N} such that M |= T (where (W )n = {m | 〈n,m〉 ∈ W}; 〈 , 〉 some
coding function).
This definition can be made in RCA0 (see [15], Definition VII.2).
We write X ∈W if ∃n X = (W )n.
Theorem 2.4 BI proves ω-model reflection, i.e., for every formula F (X1, . . . ,Xn) with
all free second order variables exhibited,
BI ⊢ F (X1, . . . ,Xn)→ ∃M[M countable coded ω model of ACA0 ∧ ~X ∈M ∧ M |= F ( ~X ).]
Proof: [15, Lemma VIII.5.2]. ⊓⊔
Definition 2.5 The scheme of Σ11-AC is the collection of all formulae
∀x∃X F (x,X)→ ∃Y ∀xF (x, (Y )x)
with F (x,X) of complexity Σ11.
Corollary 2.6 BI proves that for every set X there exists a countable coded ω-model of
ACA0 +Σ
1
1-AC containing X. In particular, BI proves Σ
1
1-AC and ∆
1
1-comprehension.
Proof: Suppose ∀x∃X F (x,X, ~U ). Then there exists a countable coded ω-model M =
(N,S,+, ·, 0, 1, <) with ~U ∈ M and M |= ∀x∃X F (x,X, ~U ). Let S = {(W )n | n ∈ N}.
Define f(n) = m if M |= F (n, (W )m) and for all k < m M |= ¬F (n, (W )k). Put Y :=
{〈n, x〉 | x ∈ (W )f(n)}. We then have M |= F (n, (Y )n, ~U ) for all n. Since F is Σ
1
1 it follows
that F (n, (Y )n, ~U ) holds for all n. This shows Σ
1
1-AC.
To show that for any set Z there is an ω-model of Σ11-AC containing Z just note that
ACA0 +Σ
1
1-AC is finitely axiomatizable.
∆11-comprehension is a consequence of Σ
1
1-AC. ⊓⊔
3
Lemma 2.7 Let A(X) be an arithmetic formula and F (x) be an arbitrary formula of L2.
Let A(F ) be the formula that arises from A(X) by replacing every subformula t ∈ X by
F (t) (avoiding variable clashes, of course). Then we have
BI ⊢ ∀X A(X)→ A(F ) .
Proof: Arguing in BI suppose that ¬A(F ). Pick an ω-model M of ACA0 containing
all parameters from A and F such that M |= ¬A(F ). Letting U = {n | M |= F (n)} we
have ¬A(U) because A is an arithmetic formula and M is absolute for such formulae on
account of being an ω-model. Thus we have shown
BI ⊢ ¬A(F )→ ∃X ¬A(X)
from which the desired assertion follows. ⊓⊔
3 Inductive definitions in BI
Definition 3.1 Let A(x,X) be an arithmetic formula in which the variable X occurs
positively. Henceforth we shall convey this by writing A(x,X+).
Define
IA(u) :⇔ ∀X [∀x (A(x,X)→ x ∈ X)→ u ∈ X] . (1)
We write IA ⊆ F for ∀v (IA(v)→ F (v)), and F ⊆ IA for ∀v (F (v)→ IA(v)).
Lemma 3.2 The following are provable in BI for every X-positive arithmetic formula
A(x,X+) and arbitrary L2 formula F (u).
(i) ∀u (A(u, IA)→ u ∈ IA).
(ii) ∀x [A(x, F )→ F (x)]→ IA ⊆ F
(iii) ∀u (u ∈ IA → A(u, IA)).
Proof: (i): Assume A(u, IA) and ∀x (A(x,X) → x ∈ X). The latter implies IA ⊆ X.
Since A(u, IA) holds, and owing to the positive occurrence of IA in the latter formula, we
have A(u,X). Since X was arbitrary, we conclude that IA(u).
(ii): Suppose IA(u). Then ∀X [∀x (A(x,X) → x ∈ X) → u ∈ X], and hence, using
Lemma 2.7, ∀x (A(x, F )→ F (x))→ F (u). Thus, assuming ∀x (A(x, F )→ F (x)), we have
F (u).
(iii): Let F (v) :⇔ A(v, IA). By (i) we have F ⊆ IA. Assuming A(u, F ) it therefore
follows that A(u, IA) since F occurs positively in the former formula, and hence F (u).
Thus, in view of (ii), we get IA ⊆ F , confirming (iii). ⊓⊔
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4 Recursion in a type-2 object
Using the apparatus of inductive definitions, we would like to formalize in BI recursion in
the type 2 object E : (N → N) → N with E(f) = n + 1 if f(n) = 0 and ∀i < n f(n) > 0
and E(f) = 0 if ∀n f(n) > 0.
In the formalization we basically follow [8, VI.1.1]. We use some standard coding of
tuples of natural numbers. The code of the empty tuple is 〈〉 := 1, and for any k > 0 and
tuple (m1, . . . ,mk) let 〈m1, . . . mk〉 := p
m1+1
1 · . . . · p
mk+1
k , where pi denotes the i-th prime
number.
Definition 4.1 Below Sb0 denotes the primitive recursive function from [8, II.2.5] re-
quired for what is traditionally called the S-m-n theorem. Let CompE be the smallest class
such that for all k, n, p, r, and s, all i < k and m = m1, . . . ,mk in N,
(0) 〈〈0, k, 0, n〉,m, n) ∈ CompE;
〈〈0, k, 1, i〉,m,mi〉 ∈ Comp
E;
〈〈0, k, 2, i〉,m,mi + 1〉 ∈ Comp
E;
〈〈0, k + 3, 4〉, p, q, r, s,m, p〉 ∈ CompE if r = s;
〈〈0, k + 3, 4〉, p, q, r, s,m, q〉 ∈ CompE if r 6= s;
〈〈0, k + 2, 5〉, p, q,m,Sb0(p, q〉〉 ∈ Comp
E;
(1) for any k′, b, c0, . . . , ck′−1, q0, . . . , qk′−1 in N, if for all i < k
′ 〈ci,m, qi〉 ∈ Comp
E and
〈b,q, n〉 ∈ CompE, then
〈〈1, k, b, c0, . . . , ck′−1〉,m, n〉 ∈ Comp
E ;
(2) for any b ∈ N, if 〈b,m, n〉 ∈ CompE, then
〈〈2, k + 1〉, b,m, n〉 ∈ CompE .
(3.1) for any b ∈ N, if for all p ∈ N there exists kp ∈ N with kp > 0 and 〈b, p,m, kp〉 ∈
CompE, then
〈〈3, k, b〉,m, 0〉 ∈ CompE .
(3.2) for any b, p ∈ N, if 〈b, p,m, 0〉 ∈ CompE and for all i < p there exists ki ∈ N with
ki > 0 and 〈b, i,m, ki〉 ∈ Comp
E, then
〈〈3, k, b〉,m, p + 1〉 ∈ CompE .
Clearly CompE is defined by a positive arithmetic inductive definition that we denote
by A
E
, i.e., CompE = IA
E
.
Lemma 4.2 For all a,m ∈ N there is at most one n ∈ N such that 〈a,m, n〉 ∈ CompE.
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Proof: Define a class X by
〈a,m, n〉 ∈ X iff 〈a,m, n〉 ∈ CompE and for all k ∈ N, if 〈a,m, k〉 ∈ CompE, then n = k.
By Lemma 3.2 (ii) we only have to show that X is closed under the clauses defining
CompE. This is a straightforward affair, albeit a bit tedious. ⊓⊔
We shall put to use this notion of computability for a realizability interpretation of
CZF+ LPO. This, however, will require that the computability relation be a set rather
than a class such as CompE. To achieve this we shall invoke Theorem 2.4.
Lemma 4.3 BI proves that there exists a countable coded ω-model M of ACA such that
the following hold.
(i) M |= ∀x,y, z [〈x,y, z〉 ∈ CompE ↔ A
E
(〈x,y, z〉,CompE)].
(ii) M |= ∀x,y, z, z′[〈x,y, z〉 ∈ CompE ∧ 〈x,y, z′〉 ∈ CompE → z = z′].
Proof: This follows from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 4.2 using Theorem 2.4. ⊓⊔
We will fix a model M as in the previous Lemma for the remainder of the paper and
shall write
{a}E(m) ≃ n ⇔ M |= 〈a,m, n〉 ∈ CompE .
Note that this notion of computability hinges on M. More computations might con-
verge in M than outside of M.
5 Emulating a type structure in BI
We would like to define a type-theoretic interpretation of CZF + RDC + LPO in BI.
This will in a sense be similar to Aczel’s interpretation of CZF in Martin-Lo¨f type theory
(cf. [1]). To this end, we initiate a simultaneous positive inductive definition of types U
and their elements as well as non-elements, and also a type V of (of codes of) well-founded
trees over U. The need for defining both elementhood and non-elementhood for types is
necessitated by the requirement of positivity of the inductive definition.
Below we use the pairing function (n,m) = (n + m)2 + n + 1 and its inverses ()0, ()1
satisfying ((n,m))0 = n and ((n,m))1 = m. We will just write (n,m) for (n,m).
Definition 5.1 Let nN := (0, n), nat := (1, 0), pl(n,m) := (2, (n,m)), σ(n,m) :=
(3, (n,m)), π(n,m) := (4, (n,m)), and sup(n,m) := (5, (n,m)).
We inductively define classes U,EL,NEL and V by the following clauses. Rather than
(n,m) ∈ EL and (n,m) ∈ NEL we write n ∈˙m and n /˙∈m, respectively.
1. nN ∈ U; if k < n then k ∈˙nN; if k ≥ n then k /˙∈nN.
2. nat ∈ U and n ∈˙ nat for all n.
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3. If n,m ∈ U, then pl(n,m) ∈ U.
4. Assume pl(n,m) ∈ U.
If k ∈˙n, then (0, k) ∈˙ pl(n,m). If k ∈˙m, then (1, k) ∈˙ pl(n,m).
If k /˙∈n, then (0, k) /˙∈ pl(n,m). If k /˙∈m, then (1, k) /˙∈ pl(n,m). If k is neither of the
form (0, x) nor (1, x) for some x, then k /˙∈pl(n,m).
5. If n ∈ U and k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x ({e}E(k) ≃ x ∧ x ∈ U) holds for all k, then σ(n, e) ∈ U.
6. Assume σ(n, e) ∈ U.
If k ∈˙n and ∃x ({e}E(k) ≃ x ∧ u ∈˙x), then (k, u) ∈˙ σ(n, e).
If k /˙∈n or ∃x ({e}E(k) ≃ x ∧ u /˙∈x), then (k, u) /˙∈ σ(n, e).
If x is not of the form (u, v) for some u, v, then x /˙∈σ(n, e).
7. If n ∈ U and k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x ({e}E(k) ≃ x ∧ x ∈ U) holds for all k, then π(n, e) ∈ U.
8. Assume π(n, e) ∈ U.
If k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x, y ({e}E(k) ≃ x ∧ {d}E(k) ≃ y ∧ y ∈˙x) holds for all k, then d ∈˙π(n, e).
If ∃u (u ∈˙n ∧ ∀z¬{d}E(u) ≃ z), then d /˙∈π(n, e).
If ∃u∃x (u ∈˙n ∧ {e}E(u) ≃ x ∧ ∃z ({d}E(u) ≃ z ∧ z /˙∈x)), then d /˙∈π(n, e).
9. If n ∈ U and k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x ({e}E(k) ≃ x ∧ x ∈ V) holds for all k, then sup(n, e) ∈ V.
Remark 5.2 Clearly, the predicates U, ∈˙ , /˙∈ and V all appear positively in the above
inductive definition. Moreover, it falls under the scope of arithmeical inductive definitions
and is therefore formalizable in our background theory BI. Note also that for this it was
important to move from the Π11 computability notion of Definition 4.1 to E-recursion in
the ω-model M.
∈˙ and /˙∈ are complementary in the following sense.
Lemma 5.3 For all n ∈ U,
∀x (x ∈˙n↔ ¬x /˙∈n) .
Proof: This can be proved by the induction principle of Lemma 3.2(ii). ⊓⊔
Corollary 5.4 For each n ∈ U, {x | x ∈˙n} is a set.
Proof: Note that ∈˙ and /˙∈ are Π11 as they are given by positive arithmetical inductive
definitions. Since BI proves ∆11-comprehension by Corollary 2.6, it follows from Lemma
5.3 that {x | x ∈˙n} is a set. ⊓⊔
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Definition 5.5 We shall use lower case Greek letters α, β, γ, δ, . . . to range over elements
of V.
Using the induction principle from Lemma 3.2(ii), one readily shows that every α ∈ V
is of the form sup(n, e) with n ∈ U and ∀x ∈˙n {e}E(x) ∈ V, where {e}E(x) ∈ V is an
abbreviation for ∃y ({e}E(x) ≃ y ∧ y ∈ V).
If α = sup(n, e) we denote n by α¯ and e by α˜. For i ∈˙ α¯ we shall denote by α˜i the
unique x such that {α˜}E(i) ≃ x.
If ℘ is an r + 1-ary partial E-recursive function we denote by λx.℘(x,~a ) an index of
the function x 7→ ℘(x,~a ) (say provided by the S-m-n theorem or parameter theorem).
Lemma 5.6 There is a 2-ary partial E-recursive function =˙ such that =˙(α, β) is defined
for all α, β ∈ V and (writing in infix notation α=˙β for =˙(α, β)) the following equation
holds
(α=˙β) = σ(π(α¯, λx.σ(β¯, λy.(α˜x=˙β˜y))), λz.π(β¯ , λy.σ(α¯, λx.(α˜x=˙β˜y)))) . (2)
Proof: Such a function can be defined by the recursion theorem for E-recursion. Totality
on V ×V follows from the induction principle for V. ⊓⊔
6 Realizability
We will introduce a realizability semantics for sentences of set theory with parameters from
V. Bounded set quantifiers will be treated as quantifiers in their own right, i.e., bounded
and unbounded quantifiers are treated as syntactically different kinds of quantifiers. Let
α, β ∈ V and e, f ∈ N. We write ei,j for ((e)i)j .
Definition 6.1 (Kleene realizability over V) Below variables e, d range over natural
numbers. We define
e  α = β iff e ∈˙ (α=˙β)
e  α ∈ β iff (e)0 ∈˙ β¯ ∧ (e)1  α = β˜(e)0
e  φ ∧ ψ iff (e)0  φ ∧ (e)1  ψ
e  φ ∨ ψ iff [(e)0 = 0 ∧ (e)1  φ] ∨ [(e)0 = 1 ∧ (e)1  ψ]
e  ¬φ iff ∀d ¬d  φ
e  φ→ ψ iff ∀d [d  φ → {e}E(d)  ψ]
e  ∀x ∈ α φ(x) iff ∀i ∈˙ α¯ {e}E(i)  φ(α˜i)
e  ∃x ∈ α φ(x) iff (e)0 ∈˙ α¯ ∧ (e)1  φ(α˜(e)0)
e  ∀xφ(x) iff ∀α ∈ V {e}E(α)  φ(α)
e  ∃xφ(x) iff (e)0 ∈ V ∧ (e)1  φ((e)0).
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Theorem 6.2 ϕ(v1, . . . , vr) be a formula of set theory with at most the free variables
exhibited. If
CZF+ LPO+RDC ⊢ ϕ(v1, . . . , vr)
then one can explicitly construct (an index of) a partial E-recursive function f from that
proof such that
BI ⊢ ∀α1, . . . , αr ∈ V f(α1, . . . , αr)  ϕ(α1, . . . , αr).
Proof: Realizability of the axioms of CZF +RDC is just a special case of realizability
over an ω-PCA+ as described in [14, Theorem 8.5] and is closely related to Aczel’s [1]
interpretation of CZF + RDC in type theory and the realizability interpretations of
CZF+RDC presented in [12, 11, 13]. Note that to ensure realizability of ∆0 separation
it is necessary that all types in U correspond to sets (Corollary 5.4).
We shall thus only address the realizability of LPO. To avoid the niceties involved in
coding functions in set theory, we shall demonstrate realizability of a more general type
of statement which implies LPO on the basis of CZF:
(∗) (∀x ∈ ω)[P (x) ∨ R(x)]→ [(∃x ∈ ω)P (x) ∨ (∀x ∈ ω)R(x)].
To see that (∗) implies LPO assume that f ∈ 2N. Then let P (x) and R(x) stand for
f(x) = 1 and f(x) = 0, respectively.
Arguing in BI, we want to show that (∗) is realizable. The first step is to single out the
element of V that plays the role of the natural numbers in V. By the recursion theorem
for E-computability define a function g : N→ N with index d by {d}E(0) = sup(0N, λx.x)
and
{d}E(n+ 1) = sup((n+ 1)N, d ↾ n)
where d ↾ n is an index of the function gn : N → N with gn(k) = {d}
E(k) if k ≤ n and
gn(k) = 0 otherwise. Finally, let
ω = sup(nat, d).
Then ω ∈ V and ω realizably plays the role of the natural numbers in V.
Now assume that
e  (∀x ∈ ω)[P (x) ∨ R(x)]. (3)
Unraveling the definition of (3) we get (∀i ∈ ω¯){e}E(i)  P (ω˜i) ∨ R(ω˜i), whence
(∀n ∈ N){e}E(n)  P (ω˜n) ∨ R(ω˜n). (4)
From (4) we get that for all n ∈ N,
[(f(n))0 = 0 ∧ (f(n))1  P (ω˜n)] ∨ [(f(n))0 = 1 ∧ (f(n))1  R(ω˜n)], (5)
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where f(n) = {e}E(n). There is an index b such that {b}E(n, x) = (f(n))0 for all n, x.
If there exists n such that (f(n))0 = 0 then by clause (3.2) of Definition 5.1 we get
{〈3, 1, b〉}E (0) = n0+1 where n0 is the smallest number such that (f(n0))0 = 0. Otherwise,
by clause (3.1) of Definition 5.1, we have {〈3, 1, b〉}E (0) = 0. We also find an index c such
that {c}E(k) = (n, (f(n))1) if k = n + 1 for some n and {c}
E(k) = λx.(f(x))1 if k = 0.
Let sg be the primitive recursive function with sg(n+1) = 1 and sg(0) = 0. Then we have
(sg({〈3, 1, b〉}E (0)), {c}E ({〈3, 1, b〉}E (0)))  (∃x ∈ ω)P (x) ∨ (∀x ∈ ω)R(x). (6)
Since there is an index b∗ such that {b∗}E(e) ≃ (sg({〈3, 1, b〉}E (0)), {c}E ({〈3, 1, b〉}E (0)))
this ensures the realizability of (∗). ⊓⊔
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